Luncheon address : the Greenspan era : lessons for the future by Robert E. Rubin
Tom Hoenig asked me to discuss what he referred to as two separate
but related issues: first, how the Federal Reserve and the administra-
tion can and should work together on economic issues, including
global crises; and second, how policymakers deal with uncertainty.
Both discussions were to draw on the experience of our administration
and its interaction with Alan Greenspan’s Federal Reserve, but they
were not to be reminiscences about him.
I will do as I was instructed, but I am going to start with a brief
personal comment about the graciousness that is so much a part of
Alan. I began my time at the U.S. Treasury as the unconfirmed
nominee in late December 1995, and I immediately became immersed
in the rapidly developing Mexican financial crisis. Alan and Larry
Summers, then undersecretary for International Affairs, already had
developed, with Michel Camdessus and Stan Fischer at the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), the view that American and global
interests called for serious intervention to try to forestall or limit the
crisis. Although in my Wall Street life I had been responsible for one of
the world’s largest trading operations for a long time, many of the
policy issues posed were new to me. Alan, with his experience and
standing, easily could have taken a preemptive attitude toward the new
boy on the block. Instead, he treated the new secretary as the leader of
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301the United States’ effort. Similarly, when we attended the Group of
Seven (G-7) finance ministers meeting together shortly after my confir-
mation, he readily could have asserted primacy at this meeting he had
attended so many times before. Instead, he treated me, as representative
of the elected administration, as the leader of the delegation. 
That was the beginning of a truly remarkable and effective working
relationship among Alan, Larry, and me. This followed, I might add,
a strong and long-standing relationship between Alan and my prede-
cessor, Lloyd Bentsen—much to the benefit of the country and the
globe, with respect to the formulation of U.S. economic policy and
the credibility of that policy and of the American economic policy-
making apparatus. During my four-and-half years as secretary, Alan,
Larry, and I had breakfast once a week—in addition to interacting
with greater frequency as issues arose—and never once was there a
single leak from any of those discussions, which must be some kind
of record for Washington, D.C., and reinforced the mutual trust that
was so central to our relationship. Our breakfasts were a mix of
serious discussions about economic data, economic policy issues, rele-
vant academic matters—those last being dialogues between Larry and
Alan, with my occasional request for translation into comprehensible
English—and also political gossip and the like. The only issue off the
table was the Fed’s interest rate decisions. 
Several years into this relationship, Alan was quoted in Time maga-
zine for the cover story on the three of us as saying something to the
effect that this all worked because none of us approached matters
from a perspective of ideology or opinion but worked together on the
facts and analysis to reach what we thought were sensible conclusions.
We all shared a belief in market-based economics—though we had
somewhat different views as to the appropriate role of government in
our society—and felt that what happened abroad greatly could affect
our own economic well-being. When our initial conclusions differed
somewhat, we always were able to reason through to mutually
comfortable common ground. The one exception was a technical
matter relating to financial modernization, but there Alan simply
waited until I left and then quickly resolved the matter with Larry.
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 With that as a framework, let me move on to examine a little bit
more closely our administration’s relationship with the Fed around
specific issues and some of the questions that could arise about that
relationship under other possible circumstances.
President Clinton took office facing an economy that recently had
been in recession, and while now growing, had long-term interest rates
of more than 7 percent, unemployment of more than 7 percent, great
uncertainty about the future among consumers and businesses, and
federal deficits that had quadrupled federal debt over the last 12 years
and were projected to continue increasing rapidly over the years ahead.
President Clinton decided, beginning at a six-and-half-hour meeting in
Little Rock, Ark., during the transition, that the best approach to
achieving sustained recovery would be a deficit reduction program that
was real. It, therefore, hopefully—and this was a probabilistic judg-
ment—would lead to lower fed funds rates, and, of critical importance,
to lower bond market interest rates, in both cases measured against
what would otherwise be likely for any given level of current and
expected growth. In the actual case, this policy did lead to the interest
rate effects we hoped for and, more importantly, it also led to greater
business and consumer confidence. Alan, as the Federal Reserve Board
chairman, reinforced the economic team’s views about deficit reduction
as the best route to sustainable recovery in his discussions with the 
president and in his public comments. He never engaged, correctly in
my view, in the contentious debate that arose in the political arena
about the content of our deficit reduction program—most especially,
about our decision to increase income taxes on the top 1.2 percent of
payers and to impose a gas tax of 4.3 cents per gallon. 
It seemed to me at the time, and it seems to me now, that the
administration and the Federal Reserve each played its appropriate
role with respect to the two dimensions of macroeconomic policy,
fiscal and monetary. We felt that our administration’s consistent and
absolute refusal to comment on monetary policy and our unqualified
support for the independence of the Fed on monetary policy could
serve three purposes: keeping monetary policy as free as possible from
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 political influence; reinforcing the credibility of monetary policy by
our commitment to its independence; and, hopefully, generating
respect for our administration’s economic soundness and thus for its
economic policy decisions more generally. A former Fed official also
thought that our clear and consistent adherence to a “no comment”
position on monetary policy may have made it easier for the Fed to
work with us in other areas. 
Our hands-off policy worked well for our entire eight years—despite
occasional qualms by some—and I think true central bank independ-
ence is clearly the optimal regime for our economy, given the difficult
politics around maintaining sound and disciplined monetary policy.
Nevertheless, it is worth reflecting on the difficulties that could
develop under circumstances less propitious than ours. The elected
administration is held responsible by the electorate for economic
conditions and therefore for the effects not only of the administration’s
decisions, but also for Federal Reserve monetary policy. In that
context, how should an administration react that consistently has a
different interpretation of current and future economic conditions
than the Fed’s and thus a different view as to appropriate macroeco-
nomic policy, has a different philosophy about monetary policy, or
simply believes that the Fed is incompetent?
Fortunately, we never had to face any of these problems, and I
believe that our relationship with the Federal Reserve was a good
model for the future. But that relationship occurred in the context of
congruence around fundamental economic views and around a 
fact-and analysis-based approach to economic policymaking and a
compatibility of the temperaments and dispositions of the principal
actors involved, including the president. Contrary conditions could
create difficult challenges in managing the relationship between the
administration and the Fed.
At this point, let me raise two germane issues on which there may
not be broad agreement. The first is how much effect the Fed has on
bond market interest rates. My judgment was, and is, that while the
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 Fed certainly has significant influence, the behavior and psychology
of the bond market also can be affected significantly by many other
factors, including perceptions about fiscal policy and future fiscal
conditions, or, as now, vast inflows from central banks seeking to
bolster exports by supporting the dollar. Bond market interest rates
therefore can disconnect under some circumstances to a substantial
degree from current and expected fed funds rates. 
Second, and I recognize that what I am about to say could be highly
controversial, I believe the Fed should not only pursue sound and disci-
plined monetary policy, but it also should stand for the principle of
sound and disciplined fiscal policy. Fiscal policy is the other ladle in the
macroeconomic punch bowl, and consistency in use of the two ladles
is powerful and inconsistency can be injurious. Further, unsound fiscal
policy can lead over time to serious economic trouble, and, like mone-
tary policy, discipline in fiscal matters is also politically difficult. This
view on the Fed has embedded in it two controversial underlying ques-
tions. First, is discipline on fiscal matters an imperative over time or, as
has been said, did Ronald Reagan prove that deficits don’t matter? The
opposite view, of course, is that there is no fiscal free lunch. Both the
difficulties of the early ’90s following the deficits of the ’80s, as well the
experience through the rest of the ’90s when the longest economic
expansion in American history was associated with deficit reduction,
suggests that deficits do matter. The second question of course is should
the Fed stand for any principle on fiscal policy? 
In our administration, the effective relationship between the admin-
istration and the Fed provided coherent and mutually reinforcing fiscal
and monetary policy regimes, may well have buttressed the credibility
at least of the administration and perhaps also of monetary policy, and
created a strong base for working together on many other issues,
including financial crises, G-7 meetings, currency interventions, inter-
national financial architecture reform, and much else.
As I have mentioned already, from the beginning of my time at the
Treasury, I was up to my ears in what became known as the Mexican
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 financial crisis, and that was followed, roughly two years later, by the
so-called Asian financial crisis. This ultimately spread to Brazil, Russia,
and elsewhere and threatened, especially in the December 1997 phase
of the Korean crisis and in August 1998—with developments in Russia
and the failure of the hedge fund, long-term capital management
(LTCM)—to engulf the United States and the industrial countries in a
global crisis. In my view, while debates will long continue about some
of the crisis response decisions, the basic approach of using monetary
and fiscal policy in the affected countries and structural reform,
combined with conditional temporary financial support, was necessary
to restore confidence in financial markets. Restoring confidence was
absolutely requisite to avoiding deeper and more extended financial
crises. In any case, the efforts worked to bring relatively rapid recovery
to the countries that instituted serious reform and to avoid all encom-
passing global economic disarray. In all of these situations, the Treasury
and the Fed working together as one greatly enhanced decisionmaking
on the tough probability and trade-off judgments involved in address-
ing these crises and increased the credibility of those decisions. 
Two of many instances that exemplify our working relationship stick
out particularly in my mind. The first is what sometimes seemed to be
an almost permanent residence at the Treasury of Ted Truman—the
Fed’s legendary senior international economist—during the Mexican
crisis response. Second was a dinner at the Jefferson Hotel, where I
lived, in December 1997 . Alan and Ted joined Larry, David Lipton,
Tim Geithner, and others from an extraordinarily talented Treasury
team in a free-flowing exchange of views; sifted through options to
confront a crisis we had never expected to face, disarray in the globe’s
11th-largest economy, South Korea; and laid the groundwork for later
finding an effective approach to that crisis. Integral to all of this crisis
response was market confidence that the Fed skillfully would use its
exclusive power to provide liquidity to the financial system, which the
Fed in fact did do in 1998, in the context of the Asian financial crisis,
Russia, and LTCM. 
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 Again though, all of this constructive engagement raises the compli-
cated question of how to manage a disharmonious relationship between
an administration and the Fed in the many aspects of addressing finan-
cial crisis. We never faced these problems—quite the contrary—but
they certainly could occur and be hugely injurious.
One lesson I would draw from all of this experience, as we approach
the selection of a new chairman, is that the chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board should not only have great insight about reading
economic data, strong macroeconomic understanding, and a deep
commitment to sound macroeconomic policy, but also have a keen
understanding of the psychology of markets and of business and a feel
for the politics of Washington, D.C., and of the global financial
policy community. Putting all those together is a tall order, but Paul
Volcker and Alan Greenspan show it can be done. 
To underscore this point about the importance of understanding
the psychology of markets, let me mention a few situations in which
the administration and the Fed worked on together. In 1997, we had
to decide whether to comment on a severe one-day equity decline
that set off shivers around the world. Twice we intervened in the
foreign exchange markets when we felt that the markets had overshot
greatly and that there was the potential for surprise and in one
instance when that intervention was tied to promised Japanese policy
changes. The administration and the Fed were periodically pressured
to take measures or provide warnings on what seemed like stock
market excesses and, in the context of architectural reform, to support
IMF issuance of credit warnings on countries. All of these matters, as
well as the many actions taken during the Mexican and Asian finan-
cial crises, posed difficult and uncertain questions around how
markets might react to various possible decisions or comments and
about how to best describe what we were doing. In all those cases,
having a market-savvy Fed chairman, in addition to having a Fed and
an administration that worked together, contributed greatly to reach-
ing better outcomes. 
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 Looking forward, our loss over recent years of the fragile political
coalescence around fiscal discipline; our currently projected 10-year
fiscal deficits; the increase in entitlement costs that becomes increas-
ingly great as we move into the middle of the next decade; our
extremely low personal savings rate and high levels of personal debt;
and our large current account deficits, all suggest, in my view, that the
next Fed chairman could face—at some point in the future—an even
greater need for the understanding and experience to deal with serious
market difficulties.
That is a good segue to the question of facing complexity. In
dealing with all of the matters I just described, the administration and
the Treasury both took the view that meaningful economic issues
were inherently complex and uncertain, and that all judgments were,
as a consequence, about probabilities and tradeoffs, not absolutes or
simple nostrums. For example, the administration economic team’s
recommendations to President Clinton with respect to deficit reduc-
tion in 1993 and, working with the Fed, with respect to the financial
crises in Mexico and in Asia, Brazil, and Russia always were expressed
as probabilistic judgments, with the recognition that these measures
might not work. President Clinton always made his decisions in
exactly that same spirit. Recognizing complexity and uncertainty not
only lead to decisionmaking that corresponds to reality—and thus
better decisions—but also should lead to intense effort to better
understand the facts and the analysis in order to make better judg-
ments about the probabilities and tradeoffs, and to serious thinking
about contingency plans in case matters don’t work out as you hope. 
Recognizing uncertainty and complexity should not be confused
with indecisiveness. In fact, the recognition of uncertainty is the 
predicate for well-grounded decisiveness and strength. I ran a risk
arbitrage operation for many years. That was all about deciding, but
on the basis of recognizing and analyzing all of the many competing
considerations, and then reaching a probability-weighted conclusion,
not on the basis of simple conviction, belief, or opinion. Further, we
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 then reexamined our decisions if the facts changed, to see if adjust-
ments should be made. 
A probabilistic approach also leads you to recognize that decisions
should be evaluated on the quality of the decisionmaking, not on
outcomes. The United States lent support to both Mexico and Russia,
and the view of many in Washington, D.C., is that we made the right
decision in Mexico because it worked. But we made the wrong deci-
sion in Russia, where it didn’t. My view is that both decisions were
right and that both represented the optimal balance of risks and
rewards based on everything that could be known at the time. This
probabilistic approach and all that goes with it, deeply internalized, is
how economic policy issues should be addressed.
Looking forward, sound decisions in the face of uncertainty and
complexity may be much needed because, in my view, our country is
at a critical juncture for the longer term. We have great strengths,
including our cultural embrace of change, the dynamism of our
society, and our sheer size. On the other hand, we face great chal-
lenges, including the fiscal deficits, entitlement commitments,
personal savings and debt positions, current account imbalances, and
much else, such as historic competitive challenges from China, India,
and elsewhere and serious shortcomings in the requisites for meeting
those challenges (for example, a world-class public education system,
adequate investment in basic research and infrastructure, and a great
deal more). We also need the resources to fund these requisites for
competitiveness within the context of a sound fiscal regime that
promotes growth-conducive interest rates, business and consumer
confidence, and a sound currency. Our society’s great resilience in the
past is a hopeful augur for the future, but there’s much work to do
and that requires decisionmaking that recognizes the immense uncer-
tainty and complexity of the issues we face, and the hard probability
and tradeoff judgments that need to be made.
Let me close by saying again that the relationship between the
Federal Reserve and the administration during the Clinton years
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 contributed greatly, in my view, to the formulation of effective
economic policy and to the credibility of those policies. I think there’s
much to learn from how and why that relationship worked and much
to reflect on with respect to the problems that might occur under
other circumstances.
Finally, let me thank Alan for providing me with a truly remarkable
experience, the opportunity to work with him in the way we did, and
the relationship among him, Larry, and me, as we together addressed
so many of the difficult economic issues of our day.
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